Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists

被引：101

作者：

Benchekroun, H

van Long, N

机构：

[1] CIRANO, Montreal, PQ H3A 2T7, Canada

[2] McGill Univ, Dept Econ, Montreal, PQ H3A 2T7, Canada

[3] Univ Laval, Dept Econ, Quebec City, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

[4] Concordia Univ, Quebec City, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 70卷 / 02期

关键词：

pollution; oligopoly; taxation; incentive; dynamic games;

D O I：

10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00038-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that there exists a time-independent tax rule that guides polluting oligopolists to achieve the socially optimum production path. The optimal tax is dependent on the current pollution stock, and it may be negative when the pollution stock is low. A surprising result is that the optimal tax rule may give firms a subsidy for an initial time interval even though under laissez-faire their output always exceeds the socially optimal output. This subsidy, however, induces firms to produce less than they would under laissez-faire. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：325 / 342

页数：18