The US Social Security System: What Does Political Sustainability Imply?

被引:20
作者
Galasso, Vincenzo [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ, Calle Madrid 126, E-28903 Getafe, Spain
[2] CEPR, Madrid, Spain
关键词
unfunded social security system; political equilibria; labor productivity;
D O I
10.1006/redy.1998.0049
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines how political constraints can shape the social security system under different demographics. A steady-state mapping between relevant economic and demographic variables and the social security tax rate resulting from a majority voting is provided. I calibrate an OLG model to the U.S. economy. Calculations using census population and survival probabilities projections and 1961-96 labor productivity growth deliver a social security tax rate of 13.3% (currently 11.2%) and a 54% replacement ratio (51.7%). This result reflects the median voter's aging, from 44 to 46 years, which dominates the decrease in the dependency ratio, from 5.45 to 4.72. (C) 1999 Academic Press
引用
收藏
页码:698 / 730
页数:33
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