Tax competition with two types of capital

被引:5
作者
Smith, SC [1 ]
机构
[1] Tulane Univ, Dept Econ, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1006/juec.1998.2090
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine a tax competition model in which two types of mobile capital are taxed to fund local public goods when taxing land is not feasible. We derive optimal tax rules and we find it is possible for localities to subsidize one type of capital. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:177 / 183
页数:7
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