Privacy and time-consistent optimal labor income taxation

被引：16

作者：

Konrad, KA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Free Univ Berlin, Dept Econ, D-14195 Berlin, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 2001年 / 79卷 / 03期

关键词：

privacy; commitment; time-consistent income taxation;

D O I：

10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00104-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Incomplete information is a commitment device for time-consistency problems. In the context of time-consistent optimal labor income taxation privacy can lead to a Pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：503 / 519

页数：17

共 23 条

[1]

Arnott R., 1994, Information Economics and Policy, V6, P77, DOI 10.1016/0167-6245(94)90037-X

[2] MORAL HAZARD AND OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION [J].