Insider trades and private information: The special case of delayed-disclosure trades

被引:43
作者
Cheng, Shijun
Nagar, Venky
Rajan, Madhav V. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[3] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhm029
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
In certain circumstances, insider trades such as private transactions between executives and their firms could be disclosed after the end of the firms fiscal year, on a Form-5 filing. We find that insider sales disclosed in such a delayed manner for large firms are predictive of negative future returns (6 to 8 percent), as well as lower future annual earnings relative to analyst forecasts. These results stand in contrast to existing findings on the uninformativeness of quickly disclosed open-market insider sales. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act curtailed the use of Form 5 under the presumption that managers used this vehicle opportunistically. Our systematic evidence supports this presumption.
引用
收藏
页码:1833 / 1864
页数:32
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