A Structural Analysis of Disappointment Aversion in a Real Effort Competition

被引:384
作者
Gill, David [1 ]
Prowse, Victoria [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Dept Econ, Manor Rd, Oxford OX1 3UQ, England
[2] Cornell Univ, Dept Econ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
关键词
DECISION-MAKING; PROSPECT-THEORY; PREFERENCES; CHOICE; REGRET; LABOR; RISK; OPTIMIZATION; EXPECTATIONS; CONSISTENCY;
D O I
10.1257/aer.102.1.469
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a novel computerized real effort task, based on moving sliders across a screen, to test experimentally whether agents are disappointment averse when they compete in a real effort sequential-move tournament. We predict that a disappointment averse agent, who is loss averse around her endogenous choice-acclimating expectations-based reference point, responds negatively to her rival's effort. We find significant evidence for this discouragement effect, and use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the strength of disappointment aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment aversion across the population.
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页码:469 / 503
页数:35
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