On the design of peer punishment experiments

被引:31
作者
Casari, M [1 ]
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, Dept Econ, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
关键词
sanctions; public goods; common-pool resources; cooperation; experiments;
D O I
10.1007/s10683-005-0869-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the "fine-to-fee" ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.
引用
收藏
页码:107 / 115
页数:9
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