Equilibrium of a sequence of auctions when bidders demand multiple items

被引：7

作者：

Liu, Qingmin ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Penn, Dept Econ, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2011年 / 112卷 / 02期

关键词：

Sequential auctions; Ex post perfect equilibrium; Declining price anomaly;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.04.012

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We construct an ex post perfect equilibrium in a sequence of second-price auctions with two bidders where each bidder's marginal values for additional units are decreasing. This equilibrium implies an increasing path of transaction prices and is ex post efficient. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：192 / 194

页数：3

共 6 条

[1] HOW AUCTIONS WORK FOR WINE AND ART [J].