TWO-OBJECT TWO-BIDDER SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS

被引：5

作者：

Szentes, Balazs ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Chicago, Dept Econ, 1126 East 59th St, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW | 2007年 / 9卷 / 03期

关键词：

Simultaneous auctions; exposure problem;

D O I：

10.1142/S0219198907001552

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the objects are either complements or substitutes. In both cases a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria are identified. All these equilibria have a surprising structure: The supports of all the mixtures that generate equilibria are two one-dimensional curves, and they surround a two-dimensional set of pure best responses.

引用

页码：483 / 493

页数：11

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