Robust equilibria of potential games

被引：48

作者：

Ui, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Tsukuba, Inst Policy & Planning Sci, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3058573, Japan

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2001年 / 69卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1468-0262.00246

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：1373 / 1380

页数：8

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