Brands' quality levels, prices, and advertising outlays: Empirical evidence on signals and information costs

被引:86
作者
Caves, RE
Greene, DP
机构
[1] Littauer Center 210, Harvard University, Cambridge
[2] Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge
关键词
product quality; advertising; vertical differentiation; convenience goods; signalling; information costs;
D O I
10.1016/0167-7187(95)00478-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
For nearly 200 products evaluated by Consumer Reports we calculated rank correlations between brands' quality ratings and prices and advertising outlays. These correlations are related in cross-section to novel measures of buyers' information portfolios. Quality-price correlations increase with the scope for vertical differentiation and decline for innovative and ''convenience'' goods. Positive quality-advertising associations mainly reflect verifiable information about ''quality'' attributes. Evidence consistent with price as a quality signal is confined to frequent but unimportant purchases; for these ''convenience'' goods high prices might induce the maintenance of high quality. Advertising is not found to serve as a quality signal.
引用
收藏
页码:29 / 52
页数:24
相关论文
共 33 条