Implications of rational inattention

被引:1512
作者
Sims, CA [1 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
information theory; control theory; sticky prices; inertia;
D O I
10.1016/S0304-3932(03)00029-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
A constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite Shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems. The resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical, while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:665 / 690
页数:26
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