THE STRUCTURE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH FINITE AUTOMATA

被引：209

作者：

ABREU, D

RUBINSTEIN, A

机构：

[1] HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM,DEPT ECON,JERUSALEM,ISRAEL

[2] MATH SCI RES INST,BERKELY,CA

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1988年 / 56卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913097

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：1259 / 1281

页数：23

相关论文

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