Opportunity counts: Teams and the effectiveness of production incentives

被引:73
作者
Boning, Brent
Ichniowski, Casey [1 ]
Shaw, Kathryn
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Ctr Naval Anal, Alexandria, VA USA
[4] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/519539
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using unique panel data on production lines in U. S. minimills, we analyze the adoption of problem-solving teams and group incentive pay and their effects on productivity. Almost every line ultimately adopts group incentives. However, problem-solving teams are found almost exclusively in lines with more complex production processes. Consistent with these patterns, fixed-effects models reveal increased productivity under group incentives in all lines, while teams raise productivity in lines with more complex production processes. This evidence indicates that teams give workers a valuable opportunity to solve problems in more complex production processes, while standard operating procedures appear to suffice elsewhere.
引用
收藏
页码:613 / 650
页数:38
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