Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy

被引：59

作者：

Keser, C

机构：

[1] Inst. fur Stat./Math. W., Universität Karlsruhe, Rechenzentrum, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Zirkel 2

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1996年 / 50卷 / 03期

关键词：

experimental economics; public goods;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(95)00769-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. We observe significant over-contribution. Our result is similar to those of typical corner-solution experiments.

引用

页码：359 / 366

页数：8

共 12 条

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