END BEHAVIOR IN SEQUENCES OF FINITE PRISONERS-DILEMMA SUPERGAMES - A LEARNING-THEORY APPROACH

被引：379

作者：

SELTEN, R

STOECKER, R

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 1986年 / 7卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：47 / 70

页数：24

共 14 条

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