The effect of CEO power on bond ratings and yields

被引：199

作者：

Liu, Yixin ^{[1
]}

Jiraporn, Pornsit ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ New Hampshire, Whittemore Sch Business & Econ, Dept Accounting & Finance, Durham, NH 03824 USA

[2] Penn State Univ, Great Valley Sch Grad Profess Studies, Malvern, PA 19355 USA

[3] Thammasat Univ, Bangkok, Thailand

来源：

JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE | 2010年 / 17卷 / 04期

关键词：

CEO power; Cost of bond financing; Agency theory; Bondholders; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION; FIRM PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT; DEBT; COST; COMPENSATION; INVESTMENT; UNIVERSITY; BONDHOLDERS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jempfin.2010.03.003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We argue that executives can affect firm outcomes only if they have influence over crucial decisions. This study explores the impact of CEO power or CEO dominance on bond ratings and yield spreads. We find that credit ratings are lower and yield spreads higher for firms whose CEOs have more decision-making power. To further investigate why bondholders are concerned about CEO power, we show that powerful CEOs tend to maintain an opaque information environment. Bondholders demand higher yields because it is difficult for them to monitor managers in firms with powerful CEOs. Taken together, the results suggest that bondholders perceive CEO power as a critical determinant of the cost of bond financing. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：744 / 762

页数：19

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