Veto-based delegation

被引：31

作者：

Mylovanov, Tymofiy ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2008年 / 138卷 / 01期

关键词：

veto power; asymmetric information; principal-agent relationship; no monetary transfers; implementation; delegation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the veto-power principle: the principal can implement an optimal outcome through veto-based delegation with a properly chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment powers required by the principal: to design the default outcome and to ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent's decisions. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：297 / 307

页数：11

共 13 条

[1]

ALONSO R, 2007, OPTIMAL DELEGATION

[2] STRATEGIC INFORMATION-TRANSMISSION [J].

CRAWFORD, VP ;

SOBEL, J .

ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (06) :1431-1451

[3] Authority and communication in organizations [J].

Dessein, W .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2002, 69 (04) :811-838

[4] SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL [J].

FAMA, EF ;

JENSEN, MC .

JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1983, 26 (02) :301-325

[5]

Gilligan T. W., 1987, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V3, P287, DOI DOI 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036932

[6]

HOLMAN B L, 1984, P115

[7]

Holmstrom B, 1977, THESIS STANFORD U

[8]

KOVAC E, 2006, STOCHASTIC MECHANISM

[9] Asymmetric information and legislative rules: Some amendments [J].

Krishna, V ;

Morgan, J .

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 2001, 95 (02) :435-452

[10]

MARINO AM, IN PRESS J PUBLIC EC

← 1 2 →