Corporate takeovers, strategic objectives, and acquiring-firm shareholder wealth

被引：74

作者：

Walker, MM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Mississippi, University, MS 38677 USA

来源：

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 2000年 / 29卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/3666361

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

I investigate the strategic objectives and stock price performance of acquiring firms. The results support both the asymmetric information hypothesis (acquiring-firm shareholders earn higher returns following cash offers) and also the strategic alignment hypothesis (acquiring-firm shareholders earn higher returns following takeovers that expand the firm's operations geographically or increase its market share). Further analysis shows that shareholder losses are limited primarily to those takeovers based on diversification strategies, when the acquiring firm cites potential overlap with its existing operations. The latter firms tend to have more favorable growth opportunities prior to the takeover announcement.

引用

页码：53 / 66

页数：14

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