Can a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement?-An empirical study from China

被引：54

作者：

Pi, Lili ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Lowe, Julian ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Ballarat, Sch Business, CRIC, Ballarat, Vic 3353, Australia

[2] Guangzhou Acad Social Sci, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China

[3] GuangDong Univ Business Studies, Natl Econ Res Ctr, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China

来源：

ASIA PACIFIC JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT | 2011年 / 28卷 / 04期

关键词：

CEO; Forced turnover; Power; Chinese firms; TOP MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; FIRM PERFORMANCE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE; EXECUTIVE TURNOVER; STATE OWNERSHIP; LISTED FIRMS; DIRECTORS; SUCCESSION;

D O I：

10.1007/s10490-009-9178-8

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This study examines the impact of CEO power on forced CEO turnover from five perspectives, namely firm performance, structural power, ownership power, CEOs' political connections, and tenure power. Using panel data of listed companies in China, this study finds that firm performance has negative effects on forced CEO turnover. Similarly, CEOs' structural power, political connections, and tenure power can increase their ability to be insulated from involuntary replacement. In addition, two factors of CEO ownership power, the state-controlling shareholder and serving as the representative of the largest shareholder, appear to be effective in reducing the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.

引用

页码：775 / 805

页数：31

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