Fair social orderings

被引：22

作者：

Fleurbaey, M.

Maniquet, F.

机构：

[1] Univ Paris 05, CNRS, F-75270 Paris 6, France

[2] IDEP CERSES, F-75270 Paris, France

[3] CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[4] Univ Louvain Neuve CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2008年 / 34卷 / 01期

关键词：

social orderings; fairness;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

引用

页码：25 / 45

页数：21

共 11 条

[1] Information and preference aggregation [J].