Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent

被引：39

作者：

Celentani, M

Fudenberg, D

Levine, DK

Pesendorfer, W

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

[2] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT ECON,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024

[3] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,DEPT ECON,EVANSTON,IL 60201

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1996年 / 64卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2171867

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：691 / 704

页数：14

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