REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER

被引：234

作者：

FUDENBERG, D

LEVINE, DK

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT ECON,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024

[2] UNIV MINNESOTA,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1989年 / 57卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913771

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：759 / 778

页数：20

共 16 条

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[8]

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[9] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS [J].

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