ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENTS

被引：73

作者：

FUDENBERG, D

KREPS, DM

LEVINE, DK

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,GRAD SCH BUSINESS,STANFORD,CA 94305

[2] UNIV MINNESOTA,DEPT ECON,MINNEAPOLIS,MN 55455

[3] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,DEPT ECON,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1988年 / 44卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(88)90009-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：354 / 380

页数：27

共 14 条

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[9] MULTISTAGE GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION [J].

MYERSON, RB .

ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (02) :323-358

[10]

OKADA, 1981, INT J GAME THEORY, V10, P67

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