"I'm just a soul whose intentions are good": The role of communication in noisy repeated games

被引：14

作者：

Arechar, Antonio A. ^{[1
]}

Dreber, Anna ^{[2
]}

Fudenberg, Drew ^{[3
]}

Rand, David G. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, Dept Psychol, Sheffield Sterling Strathcona Hall,Room 206, New Haven, CT 06511 USA

[2] Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Econ, Box 6501, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden

[3] MIT, Dept Econ, 50 Mem Dr, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2017年 / 104卷

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Cooperation; Communication; Prisoner's dilemma; Repeated games; Intentions; INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES; EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION; STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY; COORDINATION FAILURE; GENDER-DIFFERENCES; FOLK THEOREM; COOPERATION; INFORMATION; DECEPTION; COLLUSION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.013

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We let participants indicate their intended action in a repeated game experiment where actions are implemented with errors. Even though communication is cheap talk, we find that the majority of messages were honest (although the majority of participants lied at least occasionally). As a result, communication has a positive effect on cooperation when the payoff matrix makes the returns to cooperation high; when the payoff matrix gives a lower return to cooperation, communication reduces overall cooperation. These results suggest that cheap talk communication can promote cooperation in repeated games, but only when there is already a self-interested motivation to cooperate. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：726 / 743

页数：18

共 39 条

[1] Do antitrust laws facilitate collusion?: Experimental evidence on costly communication in duopolies [J].