Information structures in optimal auctions

被引：125

作者：

Bergemann, Dirk ^{[1
]}

Pesendorfer, Martin ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[2] London Sch Econ, Dept Econ, London, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2007年 / 137卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

optimal auction; private values; information; partitions;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal information structures in an optimal auction exhibit a number of properties: (i) information structures can be represented by monotone partitions, (ii) the cardinality of each partition is finite, (iii) the partitions are asymmetric across agents. We show that an optimal information structure exists. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：580 / 609

页数：30

共 19 条

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