The value of intrusion detection systems in information technology security architecture

被引:121
作者
Cavusoglu, H
Mishra, B
Raghunathan, S
机构
[1] Tulane Univ, AB Freeman Sch Business, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA
[2] Univ Texas, Sch Management, Richardson, TX 75083 USA
[3] Univ Calif Riverside, Anderson Grad Sch Management, Riverside, CA 92521 USA
关键词
economics of IT security; intrusion detection systems (IDSs); ROC curves; security configuration; IT security management;
D O I
10.1287/isre.1050.0041
中图分类号
G25 [图书馆学、图书馆事业]; G35 [情报学、情报工作];
学科分类号
1205 ; 120501 ;
摘要
The increasing significance of information technology (IT) security to firms is evident from their growing IT security budgets. Firms rely on security technologies such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to manage IT security risks. Although the literature on the technical aspects of IT security is proliferating, a debate exists in the IT security community about the value of these technologies. In this paper, we seek to assess the value of IDSs in a firm's IT security architecture. We find that the IDS configuration, represented by detection (true positive) and false alarm (false positive) rates, determines whether a firm realizes a positive or negative value from the IDS. Specifically, we show that a firm realizes a positive value from an IDS only when the detection rate is higher than a critical value, which is determined by the hacker's benefit and cost parameters. When the firm realizes a positive (negative) value, the IDS deters (sustains) hackers, However, irrespective of whether the firm realizes a positive or negative value from the IDS, the IDS enables the firm to better target its investigation of users, while keeping the detection rate the same. Our results suggest that the positive value of an IDS results not from improved detection per se, but from an increased deterrence enabled by improved detection. Finally, we show that the firm realizes a strictly nonnegative value if the firm configures the IDS optimally based on the hacking environment.
引用
收藏
页码:28 / 46
页数:19
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