OUTSIDE AND INSIDE LIQUIDITY

被引:56
作者
Bolton, Patrick [1 ,3 ]
Santos, Tano [1 ,3 ]
Scheinkman, Jose A. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
SYSTEMIC RISK; MARKET;
D O I
10.1093/qje/qjq007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We propose an origination-and-contingent-distribution model of banking, in which liquidity demand by short-term investors (banks) can be met with cash reserves (inside liquidity) or sales of assets (outside liquidity) to long-term investors (hedge funds and pension funds). Outside liquidity is a more efficient source, but asymmetric information about asset quality can introduce a friction in the form of excessively early asset trading in anticipation of a liquidity shock, excessively high cash reserves, and too little origination of assets by banks. The model captures key elements of the financial crisis and yields novel policy prescriptions. JEL Codes: G01, G2, G21.
引用
收藏
页码:259 / 321
页数:63
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