Pricing with customer recognition

被引：65

作者：

Esteves, Rosa-Branca ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Minho, Dept Econ, P-4710 Braga, Portugal

[2] Univ Minho, NIPE, P-4710 Braga, Portugal

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2010年 / 28卷 / 06期

关键词：

Competitive behaviour based price discrimination; Discrete distribution of consumer preferences; Economic effects; PROMOTIONAL STRATEGIES; SWITCHING COSTS; DISCRIMINATION; COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY; INTERNET; MARKETS; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.03.008

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This article studies the dynamic effects of behaviour based price discrimination and customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers preferences is discrete Consumers are myopic and firms are forward looking In the static and first period equilibrium firms choose prices with mixed strategies When price discrimination is allowed forward-looking firms have an incentive to avoid customer recognition thus the probability that both will have positive first-period sales decreases as they become more patient Furthermore an asymmetric equilibrium sometimes exists yielding a 100-0 division of the first-period sales As a whole price discrimination is bad for profits but good for consumer surplus and welfare (C) 2010 Elsevier BV All rights reserved

引用

页码：669 / 681

页数：13