A New Argument For Intrinsic Biological Essentialism

被引：12

作者：

Dumsday, Travis ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Livingstone Coll, Salisbury, NC 28144 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 2012年 / 62卷 / 248期

关键词：

KINDS;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00048.x

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Intrinsic biological essentialism (INBE) is the view that biological taxa have fixed identity conditions, conditions which consist at least in part of intrinsic properties. After a long period of near universal rejection within both philosophy of biology and theoretical biology, INBE is making a comeback. Here I attempt to support this revival by clarifying the nature of INBE, developing a new argument on its behalf, and addressing an important anti-essentialist critique.

引用

页码：486 / 504

页数：19

共 30 条

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Ellis B., 2001, SCI ESSENTIALISM, P54

[12]

Ereshefsky M., 2001, The poverty of the Linnaean hierarchy: a philosophical study of biological taxonomy

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