Belief system foundations of backward induction

被引:3
作者
Quesada, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Murcia, Dept Fundamentos Anal Econ, Fac Econ & Empresa, E-30100 Murcia, Spain
关键词
backward induction; Bonanno's belief systems; perfect information game; rationality;
D O I
10.1023/A:1024102216631
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of rational belief functions.
引用
收藏
页码:393 / 403
页数:11
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