Two-sided matching problems with externalities

被引：75

作者：

Sasaki, H ^{[1
]}

Toda, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] TOKYO KEIZAI UNIV,DEPT ECON,KOKUBUNJI,TOKYO,JAPAN

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1996年 / 70卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1996.0077

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：93 / 108

页数：16

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