Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity

被引：21

作者：

Matthews, SA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2001年 / 97卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

moral hazard; renegotiation; limited liability; debt;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2000.2726

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a principal-agent model H with unobservable effort and possible renegotiation. contracts are assumed to satisfy two natural restrictions: limited liability for the agent and monotonicity of payments for the principal, The main result is that if the agent has the renegotiation bargaining power, any contract is weakly Pareto dominated by a debt contract. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

引用

页码：1 / 29

页数：29

共 20 条

[1]

ALLEN F, 1990, C SERIES, V33, P12

[2]

ATHEY S, 1998, UNPUB COMP STAT UNCE

[3]

CORNELLI F, 1999, UNPUB STAGE FINANCIN

[4] MORAL HAZARD, RENEGOTIATION AND DEBT [J].

DIONNE, G ;

VIALA, P .

ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1994, 46 (02) :113-119

[5]

EDLIN A, 1998, UNPUB CONTRACT RENEG

[6] MORAL HAZARD AND RENEGOTIATION IN AGENCY CONTRACTS [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

TIROLE, J .

ECONOMETRICA, 1990, 58 (06) :1279-1319

[7]

GOMPERS P, 1997, UNPUB OWNERSHIP CONT

[8] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J].

GROSSMAN, SJ ;

HART, OD .

ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) :7-45

[9]

Harris M., 1992, ADV EC THEORY, V2, P64

[10] The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts [J].

Hellmann, T .

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1998, 29 (01) :57-76

← 1 2 →