Local equilibria in economic games

被引：23

作者：

Alós-Ferrer, C ^{[1
]}

Ania, AB ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Vienna, Dept Econ, A-1010 Vienna, Austria

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 70卷 / 02期

关键词：

Nash equilibrium; ESS; Cournot; screening;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00371-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are subsets of R-l and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We define local Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy, and present applications to Walrasian outcomes in Cournot games and separating outcomes in screening models. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：165 / 173

页数：9

共 7 条

[1]

Alos-Ferrer C., 1999, THEORY MARKETS

[2]

ANIA AB, 1998, 9808 U VIENN DEP EC

[3] LEARNING, MUTATION, AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES [J].