Interdependent preferences and reciprocity

[1] RENEGOTIATION AND SYMMETRY IN REPEATED GAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1993, 60 (02) : 217 - 240

[2] ON THE THEORY OF INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (02) : 383 - 396

[3] Economics and identity [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2000, 115 (03) : 715 - 753

[4] LABOR CONTRACTS AS PARTIAL GIFT EXCHANGE [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 97 (04) : 543 - 569

[5] Alexander R. D., 1987, BIOL MORAL SYSTEMS

[6] ANDREONI J, 1995, AM ECON REV, V85, P891

[7] What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2002, 40 (01) : 1 - 24

[8] IMPURE ALTRUISM AND DONATIONS TO PUBLIC-GOODS - A THEORY OF WARM-GLOW GIVING [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1990, 100 (401) : 464 - 477

[9] Andreoni James, 2001, INT ENCY SOCIAL BEHA, P11369

[10] [Anonymous], THEORIES ALTRUISM RE

[1] RENEGOTIATION AND SYMMETRY IN REPEATED GAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1993, 60 (02) : 217 - 240

[2] ON THE THEORY OF INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (02) : 383 - 396

[3] Economics and identity [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2000, 115 (03) : 715 - 753

[4] LABOR CONTRACTS AS PARTIAL GIFT EXCHANGE [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 97 (04) : 543 - 569

[5] Alexander R. D., 1987, BIOL MORAL SYSTEMS

[6] ANDREONI J, 1995, AM ECON REV, V85, P891

[7] What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence [J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2002, 40 (01) : 1 - 24

[8] IMPURE ALTRUISM AND DONATIONS TO PUBLIC-GOODS - A THEORY OF WARM-GLOW GIVING [J]. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1990, 100 (401) : 464 - 477

[9] Andreoni James, 2001, INT ENCY SOCIAL BEHA, P11369

[10] [Anonymous], THEORIES ALTRUISM RE