Interdependent preferences and reciprocity

被引：383

作者：

Sobel, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE | 2005年 / 43卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/0022051054661530

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：392 / 436

页数：45

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