Coevolution of economic behaviour and institutions: towards a theory of institutional change

被引:72
作者
van den Bergh, JCJM
Stagl, S
机构
[1] Free Univ Amsterdam, Fac Econ & Business Adm, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Free Univ Amsterdam, Inst Environm Studies, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands
[3] Univ Leeds, Sch Environm, Leeds LS2 9JT, W Yorkshire, England
关键词
altruism; cooperation; culture; dual inheritance; evolutionary psychology; group selection; norms; social psychology; sociobiology;
D O I
10.1007/s00191-003-0158-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Traditionally, economics has regarded institutions, notably norms and regulations, as fixed or exogenous. Surprisingly few insights on institutional evolution from natural and social sciences have made their way into economics. This article gives an overview of evolutionary theories of institutions in biology, sociology, anthropology and economics. These theories are subsequently compared with non-evolutionary theories of institutions. Next, the insights and approaches are integrated into a framework for analysis of institutions based on the notion of coevolution.
引用
收藏
页码:289 / 317
页数:29
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