Expertise and Intuitions about Reference

被引：3

作者：

Machery, Edouard ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Hist & Philosophy Sci, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

来源：

THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA | 2012年 / 27卷 / 01期

关键词：

intuitions; reference; descriptivism; causal-historical theories; Kripke; expertise; bias; experimental philosophy; SEMANTIC INTUITIONS; PHILOSOPHY;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;

摘要：

Many philosophers hold that experts' semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people's intuitions a thesis commonly called "the Expertise Defense." Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

引用

页码：37 / 54

页数：18

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