Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse

被引：86

作者：

Dittmann, Ingolf ^{[1
]}

Maug, Ernst ^{[2
]}

Spalt, Oliver ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Erasmus Univ, Rotterdam, Netherlands

[2] Univ Mannheim, D-6800 Mannheim 1, Germany

[3] Tilburg Univ, Tilburg, Netherlands

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2010年 / 65卷 / 06期

关键词：

PROSPECT-THEORY; RISK-AVERSION; BEHAVIORAL BIASES; PERFORMANCE; OPTIONS; PAY; INCENTIVES; DECISION; PRICES; CHOICE;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01609.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper analyzes optimal executive compensation contracts when managers are loss averse. We calibrate a stylized principal-agent model to the observed contracts of 595 CEOs and show that this model can explain observed option holdings and high base salaries remarkably well for a range of parameterizations. We also derive and calibrate the general shape of the optimal contract that is increasing and convex for medium and high outcomes and that drops discontinuously to the lowest possible payout for low outcomes. Finally, we identify the critical features of the loss-aversion model that render optimal contracts convex.

引用

页码：2015 / 2050

页数：36

共 59 条

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