Tax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands

被引：66

作者：

Lefebvre, Mathieu ^{[1
]}

Pestieau, Pierre ^{[2
,3
,4
,5
]}

Riedl, Arno ^{[6
,7
,8
,9
]}

Villeval, Marie Claire ^{[8
,10
,11
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Montpellier, LAMETA, F-34960 Montpellier, France

[2] Univ Liege, CREPP, B-4000 Liege, Belgium

[3] Univ Louvain, CORE, Louvain, Belgium

[4] CEPR, London, England

[5] PSE, Paris, France

[6] Maastricht Univ, Sch Business & Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands

[7] CESifo, Munich, Germany

[8] IZA, Bonn, Germany

[9] Netspar, Tilburg, Netherlands

[10] Univ Lyon, F-69007 Lyon, France

[11] CNRS, GATE, F-69130 Ecully, France

来源：

INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE | 2015年 / 22卷 / 03期

关键词：

Tax evasion; Social interactions; Peer effects; Cross-country comparisons; Experiments; INCOME-TAX; INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR; DECEPTION; IDENTIFICATION; REFLECTION; ECONOMICS; MORALE; AUDIT; RISK;

D O I：

10.1007/s10797-014-9318-z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals' occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found across countries.

引用

页码：401 / 425

页数：25

共 58 条

[41] Individual, cognitive and cultural differences in tax compliance: UK and Italy compared [J].