Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy

被引：545

作者：

Masulis, Ronald W. ^{[1
]}

Reza, Syed Walid ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ New S Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia

[2] Queensland Univ Technol, Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia

来源：

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2015年 / 28卷 / 02期

关键词：

OWNERSHIP; GRANTS; COSTS;

D O I：

10.1093/rfs/hhu082

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.

引用

页码：592 / 636

页数：45

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