Constitutional structures and regime performance in 18 industrialized democracies: A test of Olson's hypothesis

被引:10
作者
Crepaz, MML
机构
[1] Department of Political Science, University of Georgia, Baldwin Hall, Athens
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00643.x
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
According to Olson's concept of encompassing organizations, strong two-party, plurality oriented political systems should create more 'responsible' public policies than 'weak' multi-party governments based on proportional representation. An empirical measure of 'encompassment', termed popular cabinet support, is developed and tested in a multivariate controlled statistical analysis of 18 industrialized democracies. While Olson's theoretical concept of encompassing organizations appears to hold, his empirical operationalization, namely, strong two-party systems based on plurality electoral rules, does not. The findings reveal that the alternative measures of 'encompassment', popular cabinet support, significantly reduces the rate of unemployment and inflation, indicating that the wider the popular support base of government, the more responsibly these governments behave.
引用
收藏
页码:87 / 104
页数:18
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