Visionaries, managers, and strategic direction

被引：129

作者：

Rotemberg, JJ ^{[1
]}

Saloner, G

机构：

[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 31卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2696355

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Incentives for profitable innovation may be enhanced by employing a "visionary" CEO whose "vision" biases him in favor of certain projects. CEO vision changes which projects get implemented and thus affects the incentives of employees who can be compensated for their innovative ideas only when they become embodied in implemented projects. Profits may be enhanced further by letting objective middle managers dec:ide which projects to investigate even though their decisions can depart from the firm's "strategy" by differing from those the CEO would have made.

引用

页码：693 / 716

页数：24