Selfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games

被引：27

作者：

Gillet, Joris ^{[1
]}

Cartwright, Edward ^{[2
]}

van Vugt, Mark ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Osnabruck, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissensch, D-49069 Osnabruck, Germany

[2] Univ Kent, Dept Econ, Keynes Coll, Canterbury CT2 7, Kent, England

[3] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Social & Org Psychol, NL-1081 BT Amsterdam, Netherlands

[4] Univ Oxford, Inst Cognit & Evolutionary Anthropol, Oxford OX1 2JD, England

来源：

PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES | 2011年 / 51卷 / 03期

关键词：

Leadership; Coordination; Evolution; Conflict; Personality; FAILURE; ORIGINS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

We study the personalities of emergent leaders in two coordination games in groups of four players each with monetary incentives. Our results support the evolutionary hypothesis that leadership is a social good for the group: leadership benefits followers but is potentially costly for the individual taking on the leader role. Across the two economic games leaders do less well - earn less money - on average than followers. Furthermore, social participants choose to lead more often than selfish participants and there is no relationship between leadership behavior and personal dominance. Our results support the idea that leadership can be servant rather than selfish and we note the implications of this finding. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：231 / 236

页数：6

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