A field study of the impact of a performance-based incentive plan

被引:71
作者
Banker, RD
Lee, SY
Potter, G
机构
[1] SUNGSHIN WOMENS UNIV, DEPT MANAGEMENT, SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA
[2] CORNELL UNIV, SCH HOTEL ADM, ITHACA, NY 14853 USA
关键词
incentive compensation; pay-for-performance; agency theory; field study; retail sales;
D O I
10.1016/0165-4101(95)00418-1
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Much management accounting research focuses on design of incentive compensation contracts. A basic assumption in these contracts is that performance-based incentives improve employee performance. This paper reports on a field test of the multi-period incentive effects of a performance-based compensation plan on the sales of a retail establishment. Analysis of panel data for 15 retail outlets over 66 months indicates a sales increase when the plan is implemented, an effect that persists and increases over time. Sales gains are significantly lower in the peak selling season when more temporary workers are employed.
引用
收藏
页码:195 / 226
页数:32
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