The modes of value (Decision theory)

被引:6
作者
Hansson, SO [1 ]
机构
[1] Royal Inst Technol, Stockholm, Sweden
关键词
D O I
10.1023/A:1010308714135
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Contrary to the received view, decision theory is not primarily devoted to instrumental (ends-to-means) reasoning. Instead, its major preoccupation is the derivation of ends from other ends. Given preferences over basic alternatives, it constructs preferences over alternatives that have been modified through the addition of value object modifiers (modes) that specify probability, uncertainty, distance in time etc. A typology of the decision-theoretical modes is offered. The modes do not have (even extrinsic) value, but they transform the value of objects to which they are applied. A rational agent's total set of preferences should be coherent, but from this it does not follow that her preferences over mode-containing objects have to be derivable from her preferences over mode-free objects.
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页码:33 / 46
页数:14
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