The firm as a dedicated hierarchy: A theory of the origins and growth of firms

被引:204
作者
Rajan, RG [1 ]
Zingales, L
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1162/00335530152466241
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In the formative stages of their businesses, entrepreneurs have to provide incentives for employees to protect, rather than steal, the source of organizational rents. We study how the entrepreneur's response to this problem determines the organization's internal structure, growth, and its eventual size. Large, steep hierarchies will predominate in physical-capital-intensive industries, and will have seniority-based promotion policies. By contrast, flat hierarchies will prevail in human-capital-intensive industries and will have up-or-out promotion systems, Furthermore, flat hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies. The model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets.
引用
收藏
页码:805 / 851
页数:47
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