Competitive reactions to advertising and promotion attacks

被引:166
作者
Steenkamp, JBEM [1 ]
Nijs, VR
Hanssens, DM
Dekimpe, MG
机构
[1] Tilburg Univ, Grad Program Business, POB 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] Northwestern Univ, JL Kellogg Grad Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[3] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Grad Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[4] Univ Rotterdam, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands
[5] Catholic Univ Louvain, B-3000 Louvain, Belgium
关键词
empirical generalizations; advertising and price-promotion effects; competitive strategy; time-series analysis;
D O I
10.1287/mksc.1040.0069
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
How do competitors react to each other's price-promotion and advertising attacks? What are the reasons for the observed reaction behavior? We answer these questions by performing a large-scale empirical study on the short-run and long-run reactions to promotion and advertising shocks in over 400 consumer product categories over a four-year time span. Our results clearly show that the most predominant form of competitive response is passive in nature. When a reaction does occur, it is usually retaliatory in the same instrument, i.e., promotion attacks are countered with promotions, and advertising attacks are countered with advertising. There are very few long-run consequences of any type of reaction behavior. By linking reaction behavior to both cross- and own-effectiveness, we further demonstrate that passive behavior is often a sound strategy, while firms that do opt to retaliate often use ineffective instruments, resulting in "spoiled arms." Accommodating behavior is observed in only a minority of cases, and often results in a missed sales opportunity when promotional support is reduced. The ultimate impact of most promotion and advertising campaigns depends primarily on the nature of consumer response, not the vigilance of competitors.
引用
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页码:35 / 54
页数:20
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