When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

被引:174
作者
Devetag, Giovanna
Ortmann, Andreas
机构
[1] Univ Perugia, Dept Law & Management, I-06123 Perugia, Italy
[2] Acad Sci Czech Republ, Prague 11121, Czech Republic
[3] Charles Univ Prague, CERGE EI, Prague 11121, Czech Republic
关键词
coordination games; Pareto-ranked equilibria; payoff-asymmetric equilibria; stag-hunt games; optimization incentives; robustness; coordination; coordination failure;
D O I
10.1007/s10683-007-9178-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We conclude that there are many ways to engineer coordination successes.
引用
收藏
页码:331 / 344
页数:14
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