Employee treatment and firm leverage: A test of the stakeholder theory of capital structure

被引：319

作者：

Bae, Kee-Hong ^{[2
]}

Kang, Jun-Koo ^{[1
]}

Wang, Jin ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Nanyang Business Sch, Singapore, Singapore

[2] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, N York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada

[3] Wilfrid Laurier Univ, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 100卷 / 01期

关键词：

Capital structure; Employee treatment; Stakeholder; KLD rating; Endogeneity; ECONOMETRIC EVALUATION ESTIMATOR; FREE CASH FLOW; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; STRUCTURE DECISIONS; DEBT; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE; COMPETITION; BANKRUPTCY; INVESTMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.019

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate the stakeholder theory of capital structure from the perspective of a firm's relations with its employees. We find that firms that treat their employees fairly (as measured by high employeefriendly ratings) maintain low debt ratios. This result is robust to a variety of model specifications and endogeneity issues. The negative relation between leverage and a firm's ability to treat employees fairly is also evident when we measure its ability by whether it is included in the Fortune magazine list, "100 Best Companies to Work For." These results suggest that a firm's incentive or ability to offer fair employee treatment is an important determinant of its financing policy. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

引用

页码：130 / 153

页数：24

共 57 条

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